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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

pany had no legal duty so to do. The insurer is presumed to know
the terms of his policy. It might have been a friendly and very commendable act of the agent to inform his customer that it was contrary to his policy to get another insurance policy elsewhere without
the cbnsent of the company but he was under no legal obligation so
to do.
BENJAMIN

SCHWARTZ.

PERSONS-SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-INSANITY.
Kaplan v. Kaplan, Ct. of Appeals of New Work. Kaplan v. Kaplan 176 N.E. 426
(N. Y.). Lena Kaplan, insane wife of Isadore Kaplan commenced
an action for separation through her guardian ad litem. The defendant by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, has raised the question whether an action for separation may be brought by an insane
spouse through her guardien ad litem. The Civil practice Act of the
State of New York, defines and regulates the right to bring an action
for separation. The Act contains no provisions, authorizing a guardian ad litem to bring such actions. The court, deciding in favor of
the action, points out that neither infancy nor insanity will deprive
a person of appealing to the courts for the redress of wrongs. An
infant, for instance, can without question, bring an action for seperation through a guardian ad litem. An insane spouse can also bring
an action for separation through a guardian ad litem unless there can
be found some implication of a contrary legislative intent. Now it is
clear that the statutary remedy is equally as necessary to the insane
spouse as to the sane spouse. It can not be presumed that the legislature intended to leave the insane spouse without a remedy and allow the other party to openly assert rights that have been lost, as
when the other party has been guided of adultery, or to totally disregard martial obligations such as a failure to adequately provide support and maintenance. The court definitely deciding in favor of the
insane person, granting her the right to maintain this action for separation, cites in support of this construction of the Statute, cases decided before the enactment of the statute, and, in particular the holding of the Ecclesiastical courts which granted annullment and limited
divorces maintained in behalf of the lunatic. (Parnell v. Parnell 2,
Phillimore 158); (Woodgate v. Taylor 2, Swabey & Tristam Rep.
512).
The position of the court as to an action for absolute divorce in
behalf of an insane spouse is uncertain. Though not definitely deciding the point, the court says, "There is perhaps ground for inference
that the legislature did not intend the statutory right, to bring an ac-

NOTES AND COMMENT

tion for the dissolution of a marriage, valid in its inception, and resting upon free consent, should be brought in behalf of an incompetent, who, if capable of expressing choice might prefer to hold even
an unfaithful spouse, or who might indeed, in good conscience, regard
the marriage bonds as in dissoluble."
In conclusion, the court holds that in the. absence of a statute
denying the right of the incompetent spouse to maintain an action for
separation, such incompetent spouse can maintain such action through
a guardian ad litem. Upon the question whether an action can be
maintained for an absolute divorce the authorities are divided, but
the general tendency is against allowing the insane to maintain such
actions through a guardian ad litem.
AMBROSE NEWMAN.

DISSOLUTION.
Marshal v. Wittig,
PLEADING CORPORATIONS 238 N.W. 390 (Wis.), illustrates a settled doctrine in corporation law.
In this case, an action was biought to recover balance of principal
and interest due on a note. The original payee of the note was a corporation now non-existant. The three years allowed by statute (Wis.
Stats. 1929, 181.02)1 to wind up the affairs of the corporation after
its dissolution had also lapsed. The action is therefore prosecuted by the
plaintiff as a stockholder of the dissolved corporation. Though the case
was argued largely on matters of pleading, the opinion clearly implies
that the plaintiff could recover on behalf of the remaining stockholders.
It is well settled, in the absence of a statute as above cited, the
effect of the dissolution of the corporation pending an action commenced by it, whether the dissolution be by expiration of the charter,
repeal by legislative act, valid decree of a court, or otherwise, is, to
abate the action, for a corporation cannot, any more than dead person,

1 All corporations whose term of existence shall expire by their own limitation,

or which shall be dissolved, shall nevertheless continue to be bodies corporate
for three years thereafter for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
actions, and of enabling them to settle and close up their business, dispose of
and convey their property and divide their assets and for no other purpose;
and when any corporation shall become so dissolved the directors or managers
of the affairs of the corporation at the time of its dissolution shall, subject
to the power of the courts to make a different provision, continue to act as
such during said term, and shall be deemed the legal administrators of such
corporation with full power to settle its affairs, dispose of and convey all its
property, collect the outstanding credits, pay the debts owed by such corporation and the costs of such administration, and divide the residue of the money
and other property among the stockholders or members thereof.

